Possessing with Intent to Distribute  under the Schoolyard Statute by West, Sonja R.
"Possessing with Intent to Distribute" Under
the Schoolyard Statute
Sonja R. Westt
Police arrested Anthony McDonald for possession with intent
to distribute cocaine after a search of his residence turned up
about four hundred dollars in cash and twenty-two plastic ziplock
bags filled with crack cocaine.' In addition, because his residence
happened to be only ninety feet from the edge of the Richardson
Elementary School's playground, McDonald was charged with
violating 21 USC § 860, otherwise known as the "schoolyard
statute."2 This statute doubles the penalty for certain drug of-
fenses, including possession with intent to distribute, that are
committed within one thousand feet of a school.' The D.C. Cir-
cuit, upholding a jury verdict against McDonald under Section
860, concluded that the statute did not require the prosecution to
prove that McDonald had intended to distribute the drugs within
the school zone, but rather just that he had intended to distrib-
ute them somewhere.4
In a different case, Lorne Coates was arrested at New York
City's Penn Station in possession of four kilograms of cocaine
while on a train about to depart for Washington, D.C.' Like
McDonald, Coates was indicted under the schoolyard statute for
possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance within
one thousand feet of a school.6 Prosecutors brought this charge
because the Taylor Business School, a technical school, was lo-
cated in an office building above and adjacent to the station.7
The district court dismissed the charge under the schoolyard
statute, holding that there was no evidence Coates intended to
distribute within one thousand feet of a school, or even within
the state of New York.
The McDonald and Coates cases exemplify an apparent dis-
agreement between the courts regarding the scope of the mens
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rea requirement for the offense of possession with intent to dis-
tribute within one thousand feet of a school. Federal district
courts in the Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have ruled that
the statute requires proof that the defendant intended to distrib-
ute controlled substances within the school zone.8 Recently, how-
ever, three federal appellate courts-the Third, Fifth, and D.C.
Circuits-have held that prosecutors must prove only that defen-
dants, while possessing illegal drugs in a school zone, intended to
distribute the illegal drugs somewhere, even outside the school
zone.' All of these courts have examined the text and legislative
history of the schoolyard statute and have debated whether it re-
quires proof of an intent to distribute within the school zone.
Rather than join the debate, however, this Comment argues
that these courts do agree generally about what types of drug-
related conduct Congress intended to reach with this statute. A
fact-based analysis of the relevant cases reveals that in cases
where the possession of illegal drugs poses a significant and pro-
longed danger to schoolchildren-for example, where the drugs
were stored near a school-courts generally interpret the statute
broadly, and do not require an intent to distribute within the
zone. However, in cases involving a more remote and temporary
danger to the students-for example, where the defendant was
simply driving through the school zone--courts generally follow a
narrow interpretation and do require an intent to distribute
within the zone. Courts also apply a narrow reading when con-
fronted with issues of entrapment and equal protection.
This Comment proposes that courts should explicitly rather
than implicitly distinguish the different types of defendants ac-
cused of possession with intent to distribute controlled sub-
stances within a school zone. Part I reviews the current state of
the law on this issue and presents the legislative history and tex-
tual arguments involved in the debate over the mens rea re-
quirement. Part II examines the factual circumstances at issue in
the relevant cases and concludes that these factual circum-
stances, rather than competing statutory interpretations, lead to
' United States v Alston, 832 F Supp 1, 6 (D DC 1993); United States v Watson, 788 F
Supp 22, 24 (D DC 1992); United States v Testa, 768 F Supp 221, 223 (N D Ill 1991);
United States v Roberts, 735 F Supp 537, 543 (S D NY 1990); United States v Liranzo, 729
F Supp 1012, 1014 (S D NY 1990); Coates, 739 F Supp at 153. Notably, the Alston court
was bound by the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the statute established in McDonald.
AIston, 832 F Supp at 6. However, the Alston court held that the facts in the case were
"significantly different from the facts of McDonald" and dismissed the schoolyard statute
charge. Id at 6-7.
' McDonald, 991 F2d at 867; United States v Rodriguez, 961 F2d 1089, 1095 (3d Cir
1992); United States v Wake, 948 F2d 1422, 1430 (5th Cir 1991).
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the different results. Finally, Part III emphasizes the need to
recognize these implicit categories of offenses and concludes that
courts should interpret the statute narrowly and defer to Con-
gress for clarification. This approach also would punish those de-
fendants who significantly increase the risks of drug-related
harms to children more severely than those who do not.
I. THE CURRENT LAW AND THE DEBATE OVER
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The original "schoolyard statute," 21 USC § 845a,' ° allowed
enhanced penalties up to twice the usual sentence for defendants
convicted of distributing controlled substances within one thou-
sand feet of a public or private elementary or secondary school."
Congress subsequently amended the statute to include the of-
fense of "manufacturing" a controlled substance within one thou-
sand feet of a school.' Congress also expanded the definition of a
school to include vocational schools, public and private colleges,
junior colleges, and universities.3 In 1988, Congress amended
the statute again to include the offense of "possessing with intent
to distribute" in its list of targeted crimes.
14
The schoolyard statute is silent regarding the mental state
required for the attendant circumstance that the offense be
committed "within one thousand feet of" a school (within a
"school zone"). 5 The statute does incorporate Section 841(a)(1),
which requires that one must act "knowingly or intentionally"
with regard to the manufacture, distribution, and dispensing of
" Pub L No 98-473 § 405A, 98 Stat 2069 (1984), originally codified at 21 USC § 845a,
now codified as amended at 21 USC § 860 (1994).
1' 98 Stat at 2069.
Pub L No 99-570 § 1104(a), 100 Stat 3207-11 (1986), codified as amended at 21 USC
§ 860 (1994).
Id.
"Pub L No 100-690 § 6457, 102 Stat 4373 (1988), codified as amended at 21 USC
§ 860 (1994). Also in 1988, Congress once more expanded the definition of the zone to in-
clude the area "within 100 feet of a playground, public or private youth center, public
swimming pool, or video arcade facility." Id at § 6458(a).
"The current version of the schoolyard statute provides that:
[a]ny person who violates section 841(a)(1) of this title or section 856 of this title by
distributing, possessing with intent to distribute, or manufacturing a controlled sub-
stance in or on, or within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public
or private elementary, vocational, or secondary school or a public or private college,
junior college, or university, or a playground, or housing facility owned by a public
housing authority, or within 100 feet of' a public or private youth center, public
swimming pool, or video arcade facility, is ... subject to (1) twice the maximum
punishment authorized by section 841(b) of this title; and (2) at least twice any term
of supervised release authorized by section 841(b) of this title for a first offense.
21 USC § 860(a).
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controlled substances, as well as possession of controlled sub-
stances with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense
them.16 Section 841(a)(1) does not, however, resolve whether a de-
fendant must engage in this conduct knowingly or intentionally
within a school zone to violate the "schoolyard statute."
Courts interpreting this legislative silence consistently hold
that the schoolyard statute does apply to a defendant who dis-
tributes controlled substances in a school zone, regardless of
whether the defendant knew that he was within a school zone.
The courts reason that strict liability crimes are acceptable when
they do not criminalize otherwise innocent conduct and when the
legislative history suggests that Congress intended to enact a
strict liability offense.1"
Courts diverge, however, over the required mental state for
that part of the statute penalizing offenders who possess with in-
tent to distribute. Initially, several district courts interpreted the
statute narrowly, holding that the prosecutor must show that the
defendant intended to distribute the controlled substances within
a school zone. 8 Some of these courts reason that the ambiguous
text of the statute triggers the rule of lenity. 9 Others reason that
Congress had intended only to target the supply of illegal drugs
to those who attend, or who gather near, a school,2" not to create
"an antiseptically drug-free zone."2'
In contrast to this approach, three circuit courts recently in-
terpreted the statute much more broadly to reach the opposite
conclusion. These courts hold that the schoolyard statute covers
anyone who possesses controlled substances within a school zone
with intent to distribute them somewhere, even outside the
school zoneY Advocates of this broad interpretation argue that
Congress did intend to create a "'cordon sanitaire' to bar dealers
21 USC § 841(a)(1) (1994).
12 See, for example, United States v Pitts, 908 F2d 458, 461 (9th Cir 1990); United
States v Holland, 810 F2d 1215, 1223 (DC Cir 1987); United States v Falu, 776 F2d 46, 50
(2d Cir 1985). See generally William G. Phelps, Validity and Construction of 21 USCS
§ 860 Enhancing Penalty for Drug Distribution if Offense Occurs Within 1,000 Feet of
School, College, or University, 108 ALR Fed 783, 791-98 (1992).
"See, for example, United States v Testa, 768 F Supp 221, 223 (N D IlM 1991); United
States v Roberts, 735 F Supp 537, 543 (S D NY 1990).
"See, for example, United States v Watson, 788 F Supp 22, 24 (D DC 1992); Roberts,
735 F Supp at 542-43; United States v Liranzo, 729 F Supp 1012, 1014 (S D NY 1990).
"See, for example, United States v Alston, 832 F Supp 1, 7 (D DC 1993); Testa, 768 F
Supp at 223; Coates, 739 F Supp at 153.
21 Roberts, 735 F Supp at 541 n 6 (explaining the government's position).
McDonald, 991 F2d at 867; United States v Rodriguez, 961 F2d 1089, 1095 (3d Cir
1992); United States v Wake, 948 F2d 1422, 1430 (5th Cir 1990).
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from even fleetingly or accidentally passing within 1000 feet of a
school."2 3
A. Arguments in Favor of a Narrow Construction
The district courts that considered the mens rea requirement
of the schoolyard statute followed one of two lines of reasoning.
Some courts decided that the statute is ambiguous and thus trig-
gers the rule of lenity.' Others, however, simply found that the
statute did not apply to the facts in the case before them." Each
of these courts placed varying importance on the plain meaning
of the statute, the legislative history, and the applicability of the
rule of lenity.
1. Plain meaning.
Some of the district courts considered the plain meaning of
the statute. These courts concluded either that the plain meaning
of the statute tends to support a narrow interpretation, 6 or al-
ternatively that the text "is simply unclear."" Notably, courts in
the Southern District of New York have reached both conclu-
sions. For example, the court in United States v Liranzo28 con-
cluded that the statute is "sufficiently ambiguous" to justify ap-
plying the rule of lenity, and also agreed with other district
courts that the "better and more logical construction" of the stat-
ute includes only those who intend to distribute within the school
zone.29 The Liranzo court reasoned that the "more natural read-
ing" of the statute would interpret the phrase "within one thou-
sand feet of" as modifying the verb closest to it: distributing, not
possessing.30 Thus this reading requires that the distributing, not
' Roberts, 735 F Supp at 541 n 6 (summarizing the government's argument in this
case). See also Wake, 948 F2d at 1431-32.
24 United States v Watson, 788 F Supp 22, 24-25 (D DC 1992); United States v Roberts,
735 F Supp 537, 542-43 (S D NY 1990); United States v Liranzo, 729 F Supp 1012, 1014 (S
D NY 1990).
2 United States v Alston, 832 F Supp 1, 7 (D DC 1993); Testa, 768 F Supp at 223;
Coates, 739 F Supp at 153.
Watson, 788 F Supp at 24; Liranzo, 729 F Supp at 1013-14.
Roberts, 735 F Supp at 540.
729 F Supp 1012, 1014 (S D NY 1990).
Id. See also Roberts, 735 F Supp at 541-43 (applying the rule of lenity while also
rejecting as "unconvincing" the governments textual arguments that Congress intended
to prevent possession in a school zone with intent to distribute elsewhere); Watson, 788 F
Supp at 24 (applying the rule of lenity but also noting that the "more logical reading" of
the statute would support a narrow interpretation).
' 729 F Supp at 1014, citing William Strunk, Jr. and E.B. White, The Elements of
Style 30 (Macmillan 3d ed 1979) ("Modifiers should come, if possible, next to the word
they modify.").
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just the possessing, take place within a school zone. Although
agreeing that different wording would have clarified intent, in
United States v Roberts3 the court found the statute's syntax to
be "neither 'unnatural' nor necessarily indicative of congressional
intent" and held that the text is ambiguous.
The courts' finding that the statute covers only those who in-
tend to distribute within the school zone focused on the fact that
mere possession is not covered by the statute. These courts rea-
soned that the omission of possession alone indicates that the
statute does not simply increase penalties for all drug offenses
occurring within the school zone. Instead, it identifies only a se-
lect few. To interpret the statute to include possession with an
intent to distribute outside of the school zone, the courts con-
cluded, "would effectively create an enhanced penalty for mere
possession in the vicinity of a school, even though [the schoolyard
statute] criminalizes only possession with intent to distribute.3 2
The fact that Congress omitted simple possession and even
consumption from the schoolyard statute also lends support to
the argument that Congress intended to deter drug distributions
or transactions near schools, rather than to create, as the appel-
late courts suggest, a completely drug-free school zone.3 There-
fore, the district courts concluded that the statute covers only ac-
tive conduct near schools, not more passive behavior such as pos-
session. 4
2. Legislative history.
Having found the text of the statute inconclusive, some
courts that interpreted the statute narrowly turned to the legis-
lative history to aid their decisions. 5 Some courts found no help-
ful history while others concluded that the legislative history is
ambiguous. 6 Again, however, the courts found that to the extent
31 735 F Supp 537, 539-40 (S D NY 1990).
Testa, 768 F Supp at 223.
Id; Roberts, 735 F Supp at 541 ("Distributing, manufacturing, and possessing with
intent to distribute are all forms of behavior leading to the supply of drugs within the vi-
cinity of the school."). The conflicting views of the appellate courts are summarized at
notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
"Testa, 768 F Supp at 223. The Testa court also mentioned that "although to be sure
a statute's title is not viewed as part of the statutory language, it is worth noting that
Section 845a is captioned 'Distribution or Manufacturing In or Near Schools and Col-
leges.' Id.
See, for example, Watson, 788 F Supp at 24.
See id (finding the legislative history to be ambiguous); Roberts, 735 F Supp at 538
("There is no legislative history accompanying the amended statute and scant legislative
history surrounding the original version.").
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they could discern an intent, it supported a narrow interpreta-
tion.37
Unlike one of the appellate courts,38 none of the district
courts discussed in detail the statements made on the floor by
proponents of the statute. Several of the district courts did, how-
ever, refer to the Second Circuit's opinion in United States v
Falu, which relied on Senate floor statements to conclude that
Congress "sought to create a drug-free zone around schools."39 Al-
though this conclusion tends to support a broad reading of the
statute, the district courts narrowed Falu by reasoning that it
applies only to actual distributions within the zone, not the mere
existence of controlled substances near schools. 40
3. The rule of lenity.
Many of the district courts applied the rule of lenity due to
ambiguities in the statute.41 When a court's interpretation of a
statute fails to resolve the ambiguity on its face, this rule man-
dates that all ambiguity be resolved in favor of the defendant.42
This canon of statutory construction, known as the rule of lenity,
derives from the dual policy considerations of notice and separa-
tion of powers.43 The perceived ambiguity in the text of the stat-
ute and the lack of legislative history has led these courts to in-
terpret the law narrowly in favor of the defendant.4
B. Arguments in Favor of a Broad Construction
The three appellate courts that addressed this issue all in-
terpreted the schoolyard statute broadly, thus requiring the gov-
ernment to prove only that the defendant was present in a school
zone and intended to distribute illegal drugs somewhere." These
"Watson, 788 F Supp at 24, citing United States v Falu, 776 F2d 46, 50 (2d Cir 1985)
(quoting congressional sponsor as stating that the purpose of the statute was to "deter
drug distribution in and around schools .....
See Wake, 948 F2d at 1431-33.
See, for example, Watson, 788 F Supp at 24; Roberts, 735 F Supp at 541; Liranzo,
729 F Supp at 1014, all three referring to United States v Falu, 776 F2d 46, 50 (2d Cir
1985) (holding that the schoolyard statute applies to aders and abettors who are present
during a transaction in a school zone involving controlled substances).
See, for example, Roberts, 735 F Supp at 541; Liranzo, 729 F Supp at 24.
See, for example, Roberts, 735 F Supp at 542 ("[Almbiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity."); Liranzo, 729 F Supp at 1014,
citing Rewis v United States, 401 US 808, 812 (1971).
42 Bell v United States, 349 US 81, 83 (1955).
Roberts, 735 F Supp at 542-43 (citations omitted).
"Id at 543; Liranzo, 729 F Supp at 1014.
McDonald, 991 F2d at 867; United States v Rodriguez, 961 F2d 1089, 1095 (3d Cir
1992); Wake, 948 F2d at 1430.
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holdings rest on the theory that Congress intended to eradicate
controlled substances as completely as possible from school
zones.46 Like the district courts, the appellate courts also consid-
ered the plain meaning of the text, the legislative history, and
the applicability of the rule of lenity.
1. Plain meaning.
The court in United States v Rodriguez47 began with the
grammatical reasoning that the statute "applies to three types of
criminal conduct: distributing controlled substances, possessing
controlled substances with the intent to distribute, and manufac-
turing controlled substances." For the cases falling into the first
and third categories, it was clear that it was the action, the "dis-
tributing" or the "manufacturing," that must occur within the
school zone. Therefore, the Rodriguez court concluded, it is also
the action in the second group, the "possessing," that must take
place within one thousand feet of a school-not the intended dis-
tribution."8
Courts that interpreted the statute broadly also pointed to
the amendments that added "manufacturing" in 1986 and "pos-
sessing with intent to distribute" in 1988 as support for their
view. They claimed that the statute originally provided a penalty
only for those who distribute controlled substances within one
thousand feet of a school. However, the addition of "manufac-
turing" indicated Congress's intention to eradicate even the mere
presence of illegal drugs near schools.49 As the Rodriguez court
explained:
By prescribing enhanced penalties for the manufacture of
drugs near a school (regardless of the intended site of distri-
bution), Congress made clear that it did not wish to confine
the schoolyard statute to cases in which a defendant distrib-
utes or intends to distribute drugs near a school. Rather,
Congress was more broadly concerned about serious drug
crimes that occur in proximity to schools."0
In United States v Wake,5 the Fifth Circuit took a different
approach to the issue. Relying on circuit precedent, the Fifth Cir-
"See Wake, 948 F2d at 1430 (referring to "the congressional purpose to create a
'drug-free zone' around our nation's schools").
7, 961 F2d 1089, 1092 (3d Cir 1992).
4 Id.
Wake, 948 F2d at 1431.
Rodrguez, 961 F2d at 1092.
5' 948 F2d 1422, 1430 (5th Cir 1991).
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cuit declared that "possessing with intent to distribute" is syn-
onymous with "felony possession." 2 This reasoning rested upon
the assumption that, if the defendant possesses a significantly
large quantity of controlled substances, he must intend to dis-
tribute them. Because "[t]his category of possession is made a
felony by § 841, which . . . is referenced in the schoolyard stat-
ute," the Fifth Circuit concluded that "possessing with intent to
distribute" equals "felony possession."53 Under this reading of the
statute, anyone meeting the felony possession standards would
be subject to the extra penalties imposed by the schoolyard stat-
ute-no matter where they intended to distribute the illegal
drugs-as long as they were caught possessing the controlled
substances in the school zone.
A commentator critical of this reasoning argues that no pro-
vision in the schoolyard statute states that intent is automatic
when a person possesses a certain quantity of controlled sub-
stances. Furthermore, "the quantity of drug possessed is not a
constituent element of the offense of possession with intent to
distribute"; rather, "quantity is only relevant to punishment."'
He concludes, therefore, that the intent requirement of the
schoolyard statute is not automatically satisfied in these cases."
2. Legislative history.
The Wake and Rodriguez courts also turned to the legislative
history of the schoolyard statute to support their broad interpre-
tation. For example, the Wake court stressed statements made on
the floor by proponents of the statute. The court pointed to
statements by Senator Hawkins warning that Congress needed
to "send a signal to drug dealers that we will not tolerate their
presence near our schools."56 It also noted a statement by Senator
Chiles that Congress's concern was to eradicate illegal drugs
around schools. Both the Wake and Rodriguez courts concluded
52 Id at 1430-31.
Id, citing United States v Hernandez-Beltran, 867 F2d 224, 226 (5th Cir 1989) ("The
intent to distribute may be inferred from the possession of a large quantity of the drug.");
United States v Mendoza, 722 F2d 96, 103 (5th Cir 1983) ("[P]ossession of a quantity of
narcotics so large that it could not be used by the possessor alone justifies the conclusion
that possession was for distribution.").
' Russel D. Hall, Casenote, United States v. Wake: Fifth Circuit Hands Down Hard-
Line Intent Requirement in Schoolyard Statute, 10 Cooley L Rev 443, 452 (1993), quoting
United States v Patrick, 959 F2d 991, 996 n 5 (DC Cir 1992).
Hall, Casenote, 10 Cooley L Rev at 451.
Wake, 948 F2d at 1431 (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted),
quoting 130 Cong Rec S 559 (daily ed Jan 31, 1984).
Wake, 948 F2d at 1431, quoting 132 Cong Ree S 10,426 (daily ed Aug 5, 1986).
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that Congress intended to eliminate the mere presence of con-
trolled substances within the school zone, thus supporting a
broad interpretation.
In McDonald, however, the D.C. Circuit found the legisla-
tors' statements not "particularly persuasive, " " and relied in-
stead on its plain meaning interpretation of the statute. In fact,
the McDonald court admitted that several of the statements,
"like the statute itself, might plausibly support either of two in-
terpretations, one favoring our view [and] the other the district
court's."59
3. The rule of lenity.
None of the appellate courts found that the statute triggered
the rule of lenity. In Rodriguez, the Third Circuit found the rule
of lenity inapplicable because "the statute's plain language per-
suades us that no ambiguity exists."0 In Wake, the Fifth Circuit
agreed, adding that "even assuming ambiguity, we need not re-
sort to the rule of lenity, because we have ascertained a legisla-
tive purpose behind the schoolyard statute to create a drug-free
1,000 foot zone."6' In McDonald, the D.C. Circuit also found that
the statute was not ambiguous and noted that whatever uncer-
tainty might exist, "it is far from 'grievous,' an essential condition
for applying the canon.""
II. FACT-BASED ANALYSIS OF THE RELEVANT CASES
While the divergent results in the district and appellate
courts suggest a sharp division between the courts, a fact-based
analysis of the relevant cases indicates otherwise. When the
cases are examined in terms of "permanent resident" versus
"transient" offenders, there appears to be general agreement
among the courts about which defendants deserve enhanced
punishment and which do not. "Permanent resident" offenders
are those who, while intending to distribute the controlled sub-
stances outside of the school zone, are still involved in prolonged,
established, and substantial drug-related activities within the
school zone. Because of their established footholds in the school
zone, these defendants are more likely to engage repeatedly in
prohibited activities near schools. They usually store large
McDonald, 991 F2d at 870.
"Id.
"Rodriguez, 961 F2d at 1094.
61 Wake, 948 F2d at 1433.
McDonald, 991 F2d at 870.
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amounts of controlled substances in crack houses or operate drug
rings from within the school zone. "Transient" offenders are those
who intend to distribute outside of the school zone and whose
drug activities near schools are for short periods of time and in-
volve a less established connection to the school zone. Because of
their infrequent visits to the school zone, these dealers are less
likely to engage in illegal drug-related conduct repeatedly near
schools. They are often simply driving through the school zone in
a vehicle or waiting at a bus station on their way to deliver the
controlled substances outside of the school zone.
Cases in which courts interpreted the schoolyard statute
narrowly involved transient defendants, while those holdings
based on a broader view of the statute involved permanent resi-
dent defendants. Defendants convicted of storing illegal drugs or
operating drug distribution rings from within the school zone
were more likely to receive the enhanced penalties. Conversely,
when arrests were made in bus or train stations, or when defen-
dants were only driving through the school zone, the defendants
were more likely to avoid the enhanced punishment of the
schoolyard statute. Interestingly, in one instance where a D.C.
district court refused to follow the broad interpretation of the
statute set forth by the D.C. Circuit, the decisions of both courts
comported with this distinction.63
A. Cases Interpreting the Statute Broadly
All three federal appellate courts to address this issue-the
Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits-have determined that the
schoolyard statute requires only a showing of possession within a
school zone and the intent to distribute anywhere. A closer look
at the facts of the cases, however, shows that all three cases in-
volved permanent resident offenders who significantly increased
the risk of drug-related dangers to schoolchildren.
All three of the circuit courts stressed the heightened danger
to students imposed by the defendants. They also recognized pos-
sible circumstances where defendants may not cause as much
danger to schoolchildren. The first appellate court to address the
issue was the Fifth Circuit in Wake." Police arrested Wake for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine after finding evidence
that he ran a drug distribution ring out of a rented office four
' United States v Alston, 832 F Supp 1, 6-7 (D DC 1993), declining to follow McDon-
ald, 991 F2d 866. See also text accompanying notes 94-102.
" 948 F2d 1422.
1997] 1409
The University of Chicago Law Review
hundred feet from a public high school. 5 Caught with marijuana,
drug paraphernalia, drug records, and two kilograms of cocaine
in his office,66 Wake was a typical permanent resident offender.
Interpreting the statute broadly, the Fifth Circuit recognized
the potential for situations that might be exempted from the
statute: "Not before us is whether a court might adopt an 'im-
plied exception' to § 845a [now § 860] for a case where, for exam-
ple, the possessing defendant merely speeds underneath a school
in a subway train."" Although it is unclear exactly what the
court meant by an "implied exception" to the statute, the court
emphasized that the fact pattern in Wake was "the paradigm of
the conduct Congress sought to deter through the schoolyard
statute penalty enhancements."" Furthermore, the Wake court
repeatedly stressed the importance of increased danger to school-
children. The court found that the existence of controlled sub-
stances in the school zone and the possibility of concomitant
crimes "increase[ ] greatly the likelihood that schoolchildren will
come in contact with them or otherwise be placed directly in
harm s way." "
The Third Circuit was the next to face this problem. In Rod-
riguez, two police officers saw Rodriguez enter a house located
within one thousand feet of an elementary school and leave car-
rying a pillowcase believed to contain cocaine. As the officers fol-
lowed the car, packages of cocaine were thrown out of the car's
windows. ° Rodriguez was indicted for numerous offenses, in-
cluding "maintaining a building for the purpose of storing a con-
trolled substance."7 ' Although this count was later dismissed,72 it
suggests that Rodriguez meets the permanent resident profile for
maintaining an established connection within the school zone for
an extended period of time. Additionally, the Third Circuit em-
phasized that, because Rodriguez abandoned the controlled sub-
stances while fleeing from police, she increased the danger that
the illegal drugs might "find their way into students' hands.""
Like the Wake court before it, the Rodriguez court also rec-
ognized that some defendants might be caught under the school-
yard statute even if they did not significantly increase the dan-
Id at 1424-25.
Id at 1425.
Id at 1433 n 9.
68Id.
Id at 1433.
70 961 F2d at 1090.
Id at 1090 n 1.
12 Id at 1090.
Id at 1094.
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gers to the school's children. The court concluded that "[no mat-
ter how interpreted, the coverage of the schoolyard provision
would not correspond precisely with the class of cases involving
increased risk to students." 4 The Rodriguez court suggested that
trial courts would be able to eliminate "any unwarranted in-
crease in the sentence" for these "extreme cases" through the dis-
cretion granted to judges by the Sentencing Guidelines.75
Most recently, the D.C. Circuit confronted the schoolyard
statute in McDonald. Again, the court's broad construction of the
statute corresponded with a permanent resident defendant.
McDonald lived in a rented second floor bedroom of a house lo-
cated across the street from an elementary school.76 Only ninety
feet separated his front door from the edge of the school's play-
ground.7 The police found cash and more than five grams of
crack cocaine in his room.7
8
Throughout its opinion, the court stressed the importance of
protecting students from increased risks. The court reasoned
that the interpretation of the schoolyard statute "must rest...
on the desire to give students increased protection from the vio-
lence often accompanying serious drug offenses, and from the
threat of having their lives corrupted through proximity to drug
traffickers and their wares."7 9
In agreement with the like-minded appellate courts before it,
the McDonald court acknowledged the potential inequities of this
broad interpretation of the statute: "We do not deny that traf-
fickers intending to distribute illegal drugs near a school may be
deserving of more punishment than traffickers bent on selling
across town."0 Like the Rodriguez court, the McDonald court
supported relying on the Sentencing Guidelines when lenity is
"appropriate.""'
These three cases illustrate the profile of the permanent
resident offender who, while possessing with an intent to distrib-
ute outside of the school zone, significantly increases the risk of
students having contact with illegal drugs or drug-related vio-
lence. Each of these defendants had a permanent foothold inside
the door of the forbidden zone, thereby suggesting a prolonged
stay, a likelihood of repeat conduct, and extensive activities near
7 Id.
Id at 1095 n 8.
991 F2d at 868.
77 Id.
" Id.
"Id at 869.
', Id at 871.
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the school. Accordingly, all three courts stressed the increased
risk these defendants imposed on students. Likewise, all of the
courts recognized the potential for defendants who did not pose
such an increased risk to be caught under the umbrella of the
schoolyard statute as broadly interpreted.
B. Cases Interpreting the Statute Narrowly
Several district courts reached the opposite conclusion from
the appellate courts. They interpreted the statute narrowly to
require proof that the defendant intended to distribute the con-
trolled substances within the school zone. All but one of these
cases involved transient offenders, and all the defendants in
these cases were either in vehicles when arrested or waiting for a
vehicle to take them outside the school zone.82
The Southern District of New York first confronted this issue
in Liranzo. Police arrested Liranzo in the Port Authority bus
terminal with about one kilogram of cocaine. The terminal hap-
pened to be within one thousand feet of a private elementary
school. 3 Because Liranzo was taking the cocaine to Pennsylvania
for delivery to another person," she typifies the transient of-
fender. Finding that the schoolyard statute was ambiguous-and
thus applying the rule of lenity-the court decided that increas-
ing Liranzo's punishment would contravene the purpose of the
statute: to "'deter drug distribution in and around schools,' in-
cluding 'transactions' which took place near where students
gather... .85
Another district court in the Southern District of New York
reached the same conclusion in Roberts, in which Roberts and
two others were arrested at Penn Station in New York City with
about thirteen ounces of cocaine.86 Roberts had taken possession
of the cocaine in Harlem, stopped at a hotel to meet one of the
The only decision that conflicts with the permanent resident-transient distinction
is a case in the Northern District of Illinois. In United States v Testa, 768 F Supp 221, 222
(N D IlM 1991), the court applied the rule of lenity in the case of a defendant who had been
charged with keeping twenty kilograms of cocaine in a stash house within one thousand
feet of a public high school-a classic permanent resident offender. Based on a grammati-
cal analysis of the text and the court's agreement with the analysis of the Roberts court,
the court concluded that "the United States is ... just plain wrong" in its broad interpre-
tation of the statute. Id at 223. Although the facts suggest that the defendant was a per-
manent resident offender, the court interpreted the statute narrowly. Unlike all the other
opinions involving permanent resident defendants, the ruling fails to mention a concern
for the safety of schoolchildren.
729 F Supp at 1013.
4Id.
Id at 1014, referring to Falu, 776 F2d at 50.
735 F Supp at 537-38.
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other offenders, and proceeded to Penn Station. The offender was
trying to board a train to Delaware with the illegal drugs when
Roberts was arrested. The hotel was located within one thousand
feet of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice. 7
In applying the rule of lenity to this transient offender, the
court came closer than any other to recognizing expressly the dif-
ference between defendants with a more permanent connection
to a school zone and those who are just passing through. As the
court explained:
Whereas distribution relates to supply and manufacturing
implies both a foothold or some establishment leading to the
supply of drugs within the vicinity of the school, possessing,
while passing through the [school] zone, with intent to de-
liver elsewhere, does no more to adulterate the [school] zone
with a supply of drugs than a smoker with an unopened
pack of cigarettes does to adulterate a non-smoking section
or zone.
88
A third Southern District of New York case also deals with
transient defendants arrested while attempting to leave Manhat-
tan's Penn Station. In Coates, drug enforcement officers arrested
Coates and another defendant while they were on a train pre-
paring to depart for Washington, D.C.89 The defendants were
caught with four kilograms of cocaine." Prosecutors charged both
defendants under the schoolyard statute based on the presence of
the Taylor Business School, a technical school located in an office
building within one thousand feet of Penn Station.9' On cross-
examination, Coates testified that he and the other defendant
had intended to take the cocaine to Maryland.92 In dismissing the
charges under the schoolyard statute, the court considered the
problem of enhancing the punishment of a transient offender like
Coates. It found that to do so "stretches the scope of the statute
beyond logical and acceptable bounds.... [It] would.., mandate
charging a schoolhouse count every time defendants on trains, or
any other means of transportation, speed by a school on their
way to a narcotics sale."93
Following the D.C. Circuit's broad interpretation of the stat-
ute in McDonald, discussed above as a classic permanent resi-
Id at 538.
Id at 541 n 6.
739 F Supp at 149.
Id at 148.
91 Id.
Id at 153.
93 Id.
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dent case, a D.C. district court judge considered the case of a
transient defendant. In United States v Alston,' the court dis-
missed the schoolyard statute charge against a defendant in a
case where the facts suggested that police entrapment was in-
volved. Police had spotted Alston driving a possibly stolen car
while outside of the school zone. The officers followed Alston and
did not pull the car over until he was within one thousand feet of
a public high school. A search of the car revealed a glove com-
partment filled with plastic bags of cocaine and three handguns."
Although the court acknowledged that the officers might have
waited to pull Alston over in order to await back-up before stop-
ping, it also suggested that the police may have been seeking an
opportunity to charge Alston under the schoolyard statute. This
dictum suggests that the court was concerned with possible en-
trapment, particularly the power that investigating agents have
to influence sentences of defendants prior to their arrest.9"
832 F Supp 1, 7 (D DC 1993).
Id at 2.
See id at 7.
For a discussion of sentencing entrapment, see Andrew G. Deiss, Comment, Mak-
ing the Crime Fit the Punishment: Pre-Arrest Sentence Manipulation by Investigators Un-
der the Sentencing Guidelines, 1994 U Chi Legal F 419. In 1993, the Eighth Circuit rec-
ognized the defense of sentencing entrapment, allowing for a downward departure from
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for circumstances where "outrageous official conduct.
. overcomes the will of an individual" for the purpose of increasing the defendant's sen-
tence. United States v Barth, 990 F2d 422, 424 (8th Cir 1993) (internal quotations omit-
ted). In Barth, not a schoolyard statute case, the defendant claimed that undercover offi-
cers had continued to buy drugs from him until he reached the "magic number" of grams
that would trigger a longer mandatory sentence. Id. Although finding that the facts did
not support Barth's claim of sentencing entrapment, the Eighth Circuit recognized that
such entrapment may occur. Id at 424-25. Like the Barth court, several other courts have
recognized the potential for a sentencing entrapment defense. However, to date no ap-
pellate court has found it applicable to the facts in the case before it. See, for example,
United States v Appel, 1996 US App LEXIS 34013, *5 (9th Cir) (unpublished opinion)
(holding that the district court's finding that there was no sentencing entrapment was not
clearly erroneous); United States v Shephard, 4 F3d 647, 650 (8th Cir 1993) (holding that
arguments that the defendant was entrapped into selling a different drug "were not prop-
erly sentencing entrapment arguments" but rather theories of entrapment on the ele-
ments of his crimes); United States v Connell, 960 F2d 191, 194-96 (1st Cir 1992) (Despite
defendant's claim of sentencing entrapment, the evidence showed that defendant carried
out the final transaction with full knowledge that he was handling drug money, and thus,
a five-level increase on the ground that he knew or believed that laundered funds were
criminally derived property was not clearly erroneous.). Nevertheless, the debate over
sentencing entrapment is still unresolved. The Third Circuit has not yet decided the va-
lidity of the sentencing entrapment defense. United States v Raven, 39 F3d 428, 438 (3d
Cir 1994). The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have rejected the defense as a matter of
law. United States v Garcia, 79 F3d 74, 76 (7th Cir), cert denied, 117 S Ct 158 (1996);
United States v Williams, 954 F2d 668, 673 (11th Cir 1992). The Fourth Circuit has dis-
tinguished between sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation, a
broader theory, and expressed "skepticism" about the latter doctrine. United States v
Jones, 18 F3d 1145, 1152-54 (4th Cir 1994). If adopted, the sentencing entrapment de-
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Emphasizing that the purpose of the schoolyard statute is to
prevent danger to schoolchildren, the D.C. district court noted
that to enhance a sentence under the schoolyard statute when
there are entrapment concerns would encourage police to chase
suspected drug offenders through school zones or wait to arrest
them until a schoolyard statute violation had also occurred."8
This incentive, the court stated, "would bring 'violence' to the
schools, and is contrary to the purpose of the statute."99
The court conceded that it was bound by the broad interpre-
tation of the statute set forth in McDonald,' but ruled in favor
of the defendant nonetheless. The McDonald court, the court rea-
soned, "simply did not visualize the situation where the police
have an opportunity to stop a suspect prior to the suspect reach-
ing a school zone, but choose not to do so until after the suspect
has traveled through that zone."'0 ' Pointing to the stark differ-
ences between the two fact situations and emphasizing again the
purpose of the statute, the court dismissed the charge. 2
These district court cases all involve transient offenders, and
all of them fall outside the courts' narrow construction of the
schoolyard statute dictated, in part, by the courts' application of
the rule of lenity. These defendants were all in cars or attempt-
ing to board buses or trains passing through the school zone.
Most significantly, none of these defendants had a permanent
foothold or established connection to the school zone. Indeed, one
can infer from the records summarized in the reported opinions
that these defendants did not reside within the school zone; did
not conduct their drug activities primarily within the school zone;
and did not store large amounts of controlled substances within
the school zone. These factors in the aggregate suggest that these
fense may limit the potential for abuse of discretion under the schoolyard statute.
' See Alston, 832 F Supp at 7.
9Id.
..Id at 6.
... Id at 7.
'Id. The government did not appeal the dismissal of the schoolyard statute charge
but it did appeal another issue in the case. United States v Alston, 1995 US App LEXIS
38530. An earlier, pre-MeDonald D.C. district court also pointed out the possible entrap-
ment and equal protection concerns that a broad interpretation would engender: "LGjiven
the likelihood that most drug transactions in the District of Columbia necessarily occur
near a school or playground simply because in this urban area there are schools or play-
grounds almost everywhere, the United States Attorney would have virtually unfettered
authority under the statute to charge each drug defendant either once or twice for essen-
tially the same offense." United States v Watson, 788 F Supp 22, 25 (D DC 1991). Noting
the city's almost four hundred schools as well as the playgrounds, colleges, and video ar-
cades also covered by the statute, the court insisted that it would not be appropriate to
give the statute "such a broad, so overreaching meaning" without clearer language. Id at
25 &n5.
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transient offenders are less likely to have a significant effect on
the safety of students through increases in the drug supply or
drug-related violence.
III. Two POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A study of the statutory interpretation of the schoolyard
statute combined with a fact-based examination of the relevant
cases leads to the conclusion that courts are distinguishing be-
tween permanent resident and transient offenders. Courts need
to follow a uniform approach that is faithful to the statute. This
Comment contends that courts have two options. First, they may
choose to interpret the statute broadly and rely on the discretion
granted to them by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines either to
eliminate or to reduce the penalty enhancements for transient of-
fenders. Alternatively, the courts may choose to interpret the
statute narrowly, thereby passing to Congress the duty to amend
the statute and lay out more clearly what factors courts should
consider in sentencing.
A. A Proposal to Interpret the Statute Broadly and Rely on
Judicial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
The courts may choose to interpret the schoolyard statute
broadly and find that the prosecution must only prove possession
within a school zone and intent to distribute the illegal drugs
somewhere. Courts can still impose sentences in accordance with
their tacit permanent resident-transient offender distinction by
relying on the discretion granted to them under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines.
In 1984, the United States Sentencing Commission promul-
gated a set of sentencing guidelines under the Sentencing Reform
Act that greatly curtailed the discretion judges have when sen-
tencing defendants for certain offenses." 3 Although the Guide-
lines, which consist of a grid of forty-three offense levels and six
criminal history categories, do significantly limit the discretion of
the judge, there are some adjustments to the offense level still
left entirely under the judge's control. For example, the court is
allowed to impose a sentence not within the Guidelines' range for
10328 USC §§ 991-98 (1994). The Act charges the Commission with designing guide-
lines meant to "provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing,
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who
have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors
not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices." 28 USC
§ 991(b)(1)(B).
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"aggravating or mitigating circumstance[s] of a kind, or to a de-
gree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission. °4 Additionally, the judge determines the particular
sentence to be imposed under the Guidelines by considering a
plethora of factors vague enough to give the judge broad discre-
tion.0 5 Through these provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines,
courts do have the flexibility to enhance the penalties of the de-
fendants who pose a greater risk to schoolchildren, and who are
thus more deserving of punishment, while eliminating or reduc-
ing the punishments of those who do not.
This solution was discussed briefly by the Third Circuit in
Rodriguez: "If a trial court is actually presented with one of these
extreme cases, we believe the Sentencing Guidelines would gen-
erally permit the court to eliminate any unwarranted increase in
the sentence that would otherwise be imposed."" 6 The Rodriguez
court explained that usually convictions under the schoolyard
statute involve a one- or two-point increase in the offense level
under the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, the court concluded,
if a defendant technically qualifies for the enhancement "but it is
clear that the defendant's conduct did not create any increased
risk for those whom the schoolyard statute was intended to pro-
tect, we believe that a one- or two-point downward departure to
eliminate this increase would be permissible." °7
The D.C. Circuit in McDonald also supported this approach,
stating that "[i]f lenity is appropriate in a particular case, a
downward departure pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines is
the means for exercising it." °8 Because the Guidelines "do not
1- 18 USC § 3553(b) (1994).
"
6 See 18 USC § 3553(a) (1994):
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteris-
tics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.
For support that there remains ample opportunity for the exercise of judicial discretion
under the Sentencing Guidelines, see Gerald B. Tjoflat, The Untapped Potential for Judi-
cial Discretion under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 55 Fed Probation 4 (Dec 1991)
(admonishing critics for "fail[ing] to appreciate the significant discretion the sentencing
judge retains under the guidelines").
10961 F2d at 1095 n 8.
1.. Id.
"McDonald, 991 F2d at 871.
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specifically address situations in which the fit is poor between
the offense and the purpose of the statute violated," the court
concluded that it might be a factor not adequately considered by
the Commission and thus open to judicial discretion. °9 However,
the district court in Alston refused to follow the McDonald court's
advice when faced with a transient offender. Rather than ad-
justing Alston's sentence down through the sentencing guide-
lines, the court dismissed the charge entirely and stated that the
McDonald court "simply did not visualize [this] situation.""' Ex-
actly why the Alston court chose this method to achieve the de-
sired result, rather than through the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines as proposed by the D.C. Circuit, is not clear.
Relying on the Sentencing Guidelines gives judges control to
sort defendants on a case-by-case basis. If this discretion is exer-
cised properly, the more blameworthy offenders (the permanent
resident defendants) will receive the full enhanced penalties,
while the less culpable offenders (the transient defendants) will
receive lesser sentences through the judge's discretion. Unlike
the other option of relying on Congress to amend the statute,
courts need not be concerned about overcoming legislative inertia
and the possibility that congressional apathy will allow the cul-
pable defendants to escape the statute under this approach.
Furthermore, as a deterrent against the targeted criminal
conduct, this proposal comports with the concept of "acoustic
separation." This theory posits that, when a court sets out one
standard as the rule of law (the "conduct rules"), while following
another in practice (the "decision rules"), a desired deterrent ef-
fect can often be achieved."' In the case of the schoolyard statute,
the rule of law would remain the broad interpretation of "intent"
to mean "intent to distribute anywhere." A defendant who pos-
sesses controlled substances within one thousand feet of a school
with the intention of distributing them outside of the school zone
is violating the letter of the law. However, following the "acoustic
separation" approach, defendants who do not significantly in-
crease the danger of schoolchildren are afforded lenity under the
judge's sentencing discretion. Acoustic separation would explain
the effect of this practice on potential offenders. Those who know
about the law and its common exceptions will not be able to rely
confidently on the court to grant them a reprieve from the stat-
ute should they be convicted. Therefore, it will be in their best in-
9 Id at 870.
"'Alston, 832 F Supp at 7.
"See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation In
Criminal Law, 97 Harv L Rev 625, 650-51 (1984).
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terest to learn where school zones are and move their drug activi-
ties outside of these zones. These individuals are more likely to
be the dealers who have prolonged, significant, on-going, and ex-
tensive drug activities within a school zone. In other words, the
permanent resident offenders are more likely to know both where
the school zones begin and end and, due to their extensive drug
activities, what the relevant laws dictate. These defendants are
then not likely to be less deterred from moving their activities
away from schools simply because courts are known to make oc-
casional exceptions to the statute.
The transient defendants, on the other hand, have a much
more remote connection to school zones and to the laws applying
to these areas. Because their activities involve shorter time peri-
ods and less significant dangers to children, these offenders are
less likely to know the boundaries of the school zones and the
applicable laws. Therefore, these defendants are not likely to
step up their prohibited activities within school zones simply be-
cause of the potential for leniency.
Although there are many positive aspects of this proposal,
there are just as many negative considerations. First is the great
potential for a lack of uniformity among courts. As with any
situation where justice relies on individual discretion, one cannot
be confident that judges will exempt all transient offenders from
the enhanced penalty while consistently increasing the punish-
ments of the more culpable permanent resident offenders. Simi-
larly, more of the power to distinguish between these defendants
may be shifted to prosecutors." Without a congressional
amendment, the courts will not have a uniform set of factors to
consider when deciding whether or not to impose the penalties of
the statute. Although such an amendment would not remove all
judicial discretion, a list of relevant factors to consider would add
greater uniformity to the sentences imposed by judges through-
out the country.
The potential for a lack of uniformity may also raise equal
protection issues. If the point of this proposal is to increase the
punishment of offenders who endanger the safety of schoolchil-
dren more than the punishment of offenders who impose a less
significant risk on children, then a non-uniform application of the
statute may be either underinclusive or overinclusive. It could be
underinclusive if some judges decrease the penalties of some
permanent resident offenders who pose a significant risk to chil-
"See Deiss, Comment, 1994 U Chi Legal F at 419 n 4 (cited in note 97) ('Prosecutors
have extraordinary discretion at virtually every stage of the prosecution.").
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dren while other judges do not. Similarly, it could be overinclu-
sive if some courts grant leniency for transient offenders while
others do not."' Either way, it would not be treating similarly
situated defendants alike.
Additionally, the lack of guidance from the legislative branch
opens the door for judicial lawmaking. In essence, courts follow-
ing this approach will be recognizing exceptions to a statute that
Congress did not enact and the President did not sign, thus vio-
lating the constitutional mandate under Article I of bicameral
consideration and presentment." Congress is democratically
elected and is therefore more accountable to the electorate. Also,
Congress is the body of government equipped to deliberate and
debate an issue. For a topic as controversial as illegal drugs and
schools, it is important to preserve the deliberation and debating
steps of the legislative process. Although there are strong argu-
ments that this proposal mirrors Congress's intentions in enact-
ing the schoolyard statute, a clearer signal from the lawmaking
branch would eliminate the potential for judicial overreaching.
Proper notice is another concern. An approach such as this
one, which in essence dictates an exception to a statute without
codifying it, does not give citizens the proper notice that their ac-
tivities may or may not be subject to punishment under the
schoolyard statute. A response to this argument is that the
schoolyard statute does not criminalize previously non-criminal
behavior, but rather enhances penalties for already illegal activi-
ties. Therefore, the affected defendants have already been put on
notice that their conduct is prohibited. Additionally, under an
acoustic separation theory there is notice of criminal liability.
Only those offenders eligible for judicial lenience lack notice of
that eligibility.
B. A Proposal to Interpret the Statute Narrowly and Defer to
Congress for Amendment
The courts' other option to address the ambiguities in the
schoolyard statute is simply to interpret the statute narrowly to
exclude cases that lack evidence of intent to distribute outside
" Cases challenging other parts of the schoolyard statute on equal protection grounds
for being "overinclusive" or "underinclusive" have failed. Those cases, however, all in-
volved the penalty enhancements for the sale of narcotics within the zone versus sales
outside of the zone. See, for example, United States v Campbell, 935 F2d 39, 45 (4th Cir
1991) (finding that Congress's actions were "rationally related to a legitimate government
interest"); United States v Crew, 916 F2d 980, 983 (5th Cir 1990) (same); United States v
Cross, 900 F2d 66, 68 (6th Cir 1990) (same).
..US Const, Art I, § 7, cl 2.
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the zone. This solution allows Congress to amend the statute to
achieve greater specificity if it dislikes the courts' narrow inter-
pretation.
In Rodriguez, the Third Circuit recognized the difficulties of
applying the schoolyard statute to these borderline defendants:
"No matter how interpreted, the coverage of the schoolyard pro-
vision would not correspond precisely with the class of cases in-
volving increased risk to students.""5 The court understood that
the narrow interpretation "would make the statute inapplicable
in several situations in which the mere possession of sizable
quantities of drugs near a school would create an increased risk
for students.""6 However, the Rodriguez court concluded that
this amount of "imprecision" in the statute was inevitable."1
Congress was faced with a difficult decision, the court explained,
between choosing either (a) requiring proof of intent to distribute
within the school zone and thus not covering situations "in which
the mere possession of sizable quantities of controlled substances
near a school would pose an increased risk to students," or (b) not
requiring such proof and making the statute applicable in situa-
tions "involving no increased risk to students.""8
The Rodriguez court's analysis of Congress's options as es-
sentially all-or-nothing was incomplete. Congress had, and still
has through the amendment process, the option of developing a
list of relevant factors relating to whether an activity signifi-
cantly increases the risk to students and therefore should be
punished under the schoolyard statute. For example, Congress
can state that, in order to enhance the sentence of a defendant
who is charged with possessing controlled substances within a
school zone, with the intent to distribute them outside of the
school zone, the prosecution must prove that the defendant "sig-
nificantly increased" the risk to schoolchildren of dangers associ-
ated with controlled substances, including exposure to illegal
drugs and drug-related violence.
If Congress reaches conclusions similar to those of this
Comment, the amended statute could require consideration of
the duration of the possession within the school zone, the quan-
tity of the controlled substances involved, and whether the of-
fender had an established foothold or residence within the school
zone. With additional guidance, the courts could properly decide
these questions, allowing the community to determine which de-
1 5961 F2d at 1094.
116 Id.
.
1 Id at 1095.
18Id.
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fendants endangered the children more and which endangered
them less.
It is also possible that Congress could present these factors
as guidance to be used by courts in sentencing. Once a defendant
is convicted under the schoolyard statute, judges could turn to
this list of congressionally enacted factors when determining
whether or not the offender deserves the full force of the statute
or a lesser sentence. The result would be similar to that of the
proposal suggested above that relies on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. Here, however, the courts would have the benefit of
congressional guidance when making sentencing decisions, thus
creating greater uniformity and avoiding the problem of judicial
activism.
This approach, like the first discussed above, would separate
the permanent resident offenders from the transient offenders. If
Congress intended to increase the punishment for drug dealers
whose conduct significantly increases the danger to schoolchil-
dren, underenforcement of the statute by the courts should cause
legislators to take action and state more clearly which offenders
should receive the enhanced penalties.
A list of factors for courts to consider in cases where defen-
dants possessed within the school zone with an intent to distrib-
ute elsewhere would separate the more culpable from the less
culpable and ensure greater uniformity within the judicial sys-
tem. Alternatively, if Congress did not intend to distinguish be-
tween the two groups of defendants, a grammatically unambigu-
ous statute clarifying the mens rea requirement would give
courts the direction they need to carry out Congress's intentions.
Finally, if Congress did intend a narrow interpretation of the
statute such that the courts are in fact interpreting it correctly, it
can simply acquiesce, leaving the statute untouched. It is cer-
tainly possible that the implicit distinction being made by the
courts is simply wrong. If so, it is constitutionally more proper
for courts to demand specificity and then to adjudicate laws that
they know Congress intended.
The strongest argument against this proposal to send the
statute back to Congress is that of legislative inertia. Relying on
Congress to amend the statute leaves the courts with the risk
that Congress will fail to act and therefore allow blameworthy
defendants to avoid the added punishment that Congress in-
tended them to receive. The weight of the legislative workload,
the difficult and time-consuming process of amending a statute,
and the number of issues demanding immediate attention all
minimize the chance that Congress will address the issue again.
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Therefore, courts risk imposing an erroneous interpretation of a
statute for years and possibly decades." 9 However, if any issue in
criminal law today will catch the legislators' attention, it is one
involving both illegal drugs and schoolchildren. Congress has al-
ready amended this statute twice. Furthermore, the issue of drug
use among teenagers was a major issue during the 1996 election
campaigns of presidential candidates Bill Clinton and Bob Dole
that resulted in a slew of television attack ads from both major
parties.' The pervasive controversy surrounding illegal drugs
and their effects on children renders considerably smaller the
fear that Congress will turn its back on this issue.
CONCLUSION
A fact-based analysis of the relevant cases under the school-
yard statute reveals that courts generally agree on the types of
drug dealers who should receive the heightened penalties of the
statute and those who should not. The more culpable offenders
are those who have an established foothold in the school zone
through prolonged, substantial, and ongoing drug activities.
These permanent resident offenders significantly increase the
danger that schoolchildren will be affected by illegal drugs or
drug-related violence. The less blameworthy offenders are those
who have a fleeting, temporary, and less extensive association
with the school zone. These transient offenders are less likely to
lure students into drug use or expose them to drug-related vio-
lence.
Courts could consider interpreting the statute broadly to in-
elude all of these defendants and afford lenity to the transient of-
fenders through their discretion under the Sentencing Guide-
lines. However, because of the constitutional concerns about judi-
cial lawmaking, lack of uniformity, entrapment, and equal pro-
tection, there is a better option. Federal courts could interpret
the "possessing with intent to distribute" portion of the school-
yard statute narrowly to exclude cases that lack evidence of in-
tent to distribute within the zone. If the judiciary is indeed un-
derenforcing the statute through its narrow interpretation, Con-
gress bears the burden of amending the statute if a distinction
between permanent resident and transient offenders was in-
tended. If Congress did not intend such a distinction, it can clar-
"See S. Fred Singer, Overdue Farewell to the Delaney Clause?, Wash Times A21
(July 12, 1995) (applauding the repeal of a 1958 law which banned any food additive
shown to cause cancer in lab animals).
See Paul Miller, Teenage Drug Abuse is a Prominent Campaign Issue, NPR, Morn-
ing Ed (Sept 19, 1996).
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ify which defendants should be punished more severely. Finally,
if the courts' narrow interpretation comports with congressional
intent, Congress can simply acquiesce.
